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I. INTRODUCTION
Today, Americans age sixty-five and older continue to join the
workforce.' According to the Pew Research Center, as of 2016, more than
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1. Drew Desilver, More Older Americans Are Working and Working More, Than
They Used To, PEW RES. CTR. (June 20, 2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2016/06/20/more-older-americans-are-working-and-working-more-than-they-
used-to/.
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eighteen percent of this age group was employed.2 Although they are known
as the "Baby Boomer generation," older workers nevertheless seem reluctant
to retire.3 This generation is still dealing with the ramifications from the
economic crisis, and many Baby Boomers want to make more money before
they retire.4 On the one hand, businesses benefit from the experience that
older workers can provide them.' As AARP's Senior Vice President Jean
Setzfand noted, "older workers frequently bring traits that are highly sought
after in the workplace: experience, maturity, professionalism, a strong work
ethic, loyalty, reliability, knowledge, strong communication skills and the
ability to serve as mentors."6 Nonetheless, more businesses are laying off
older workers.7 For instance, Fidelity Investments recently bought-out 3,000
employees, all of whom were at least fifty-five years old.' The company,
however, is not the only one to take this action, and it is likely that more
employers will also buyout older employees.9
Although states have enacted employment discrimination laws, federal
laws also address workforce discrimination.'o The Age Discrimination in
Employment Act ("ADEA") currently protects employees forty years old or
older from discriminatory employment policies." Employees can challenge
these policies on the basis of two different theories: disparate-treatment
and/or disparate-impact.1 2 For purposes of disparate-treatment claims, the
2. Id.
3. See generally Ben Steverman, 'I'll Never Retire': Americans Break Record for
Working Past 65, BLOOMBERG (May 13, 2016, 5:57 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2016-05-13/-i-ll-never-retire-americans-break-record-for-working-past-
65 (discussing reasons why Baby Boomers delay retirement, including financial and
health considerations).
4. Id.
5. See Steverman, supra note 3; see also Richard Eisenberg, Fidelity Latest to Offer
Worker Buyouts: Double-Edged Sword?, FORBES (Mar. 1, 2017, 4:48 PM), https://www
.forbes.com/sites/nextavenue/2017/03/01/fidelity-latest-to-offer-older-worker-buyouts-
double-edge-sword/#c9cf9a06f6ff.
6. Eisenberg, supra note 5.
7. See id (noting some of the companies that have bought out employees and
predicting that more companies will undergo voluntary terminations).
8. See generally id. (discussing the extent to which voluntary terminations are
lawful under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act).
9. See id. (explaining that UPMC, Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Illinois, and the
Philadelphia Media Network are examples of companies that have offered buyouts to
older workers).
10. See e.g., Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 (2012); 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296(a) (Consol. 1951); CAL. PROHIBITED
§ 129409(a) (Deering 1980).
11. 29 U.S.C. § 631(a).
12. Id. § 623(a)(1)-(2); see also Karlo v. Pittsburgh Glass Works, LLC, 849 F.3d 61,
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United States Supreme Court has said that "the fact that one person in the
protected class has lost out to another person in the protected class is thus
irrelevant, so long as he has lost out because of his age." 3 In Karlo v.
Pittsburgh Glass Works, LLC, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
found that employees may use subgroup comparators 4 for ADEA disparate-
impact claims.'" Should Pittsburgh Glass Works ("PGW") appeal, the Third
Circuit's decision, which created a conspicuous circuit split, provides an
opportunity for the Court to clarify its ADEA disparate-impact
jurisprudence. 6
This Comment argues that, if PGW appeals the Third Circuit's decision in
Karlo to the Supreme Court, the Court will likely affirm the Third Circuit's
decision." This Comment will first discuss disparate-impact jurisprudence,
including the theory's scope under the ADEA." Specifically, it will focus
on disparate-impact theory under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, its
extension to the ADEA by way of Supreme Court jurisprudence, and the
Court's interpretation of the ADEA itself.9 Next, this Comment will analyze
the ways in which U.S. circuit courts interpret disparate-impact theory and
the ADEA, thereby demonstrating why the Third Circuit's reasoning
prevails.20 It further recommends that the Court resolve the circuit split by
69 (3d Cir. 2017).
13. O'Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 312 (1996).
14. See generally Patrick Dorrian, Older Workers Can Sue for Age Bias Even If
Comparators Are 40-Plus, BLOOMBERG L. (Jan. 11, 2017), https://www.bna.com/older-
workers-sue-n73014449636/ (defining comparator as a term used for the group you are
using to compare the subgroup with).
15. Karlo, 849 F.3d at 67-68.
16. See id. at 69 (allowing ADEA subgroup disparate-impact claims, "so long as that
evidence meets the usual standards for admissibility"); see also Dorrian, supra note 14
(noting reactions on the likelihood of Pittsburgh Glass Works appealing the Third
Circuit's decision to the Supreme Court).
17. See Karlo, 849 F.3d at 68.
18. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(2) (2012) (providing that employees can challenge
employment practices that affect the employee "because of such individual's age"); see
also Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 236 (2005); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401
U.S. 424, 431 (1970) (prohibiting facially neutral employment practices that benefit a
particular group).
19. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1)-(2) (barring age discrimination); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(a) (1964) (listing "race, color, religion, sex, or national origin" as its protected classes);
see also Smith, 544 U.S. at 240; Griggs, 401 U.S. at 430-31. See generally O'Connor v.
Consol. Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308 (1996).
20. See generally Karlo, 849 F.3d 61 n.7 (justifying it's "compelling basis" for
creating this circuit split by highlighting three factors: "(1) the Second Circuit and Sixth
Circuit cases predate ... O'Connor and Smith; (2) the Sixth Circuit case is non-
precedential; and (3) the Eighth Circuit case predates Smith"); EEOC v. McDonnell
Douglas Corp., 191 F.3d 948 (8th Cir. 1999); Smith v. TVA, 924 F.2d 1059 (6th Cir.
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upholding the Third Circuit's interpretation of ADEA sections 623(a)(1) and
623(a)(2).2 ' Lastly, it concludes that the Third Circuit's ruling is indeed
consistent with the ADEA, and that, if PGW appeals to the Supreme Court,
the Court will likely uphold the Third Circuit's decision on subgroup
disparate-impact claims.22
II. THE RISE OF AGE DISCRIMINATION JURISPRUDENCE AND THE
DISPARATE-IMPACT THEORY
Discrimination claims ordinarily contend that a plaintiff has suffered
disparate-treatment and/or disparate-impact.23 Intentional discriminatory
acts against an employee constitute disparate-treatment.24 Conversely,
disparate-impact claims challenge policies lacking discriminatory intent, but
nonetheless benefit a particular group.25
A. Supreme Court Title VII Case Law
In Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 26 African American employees challenged
Duke Power Company's standardized testing employment policy under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act, which provides that:
it shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer -
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise
to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect
his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color,
1991); Barnes v. GenCorp, 896 F.2d 1457 (6th Cir. 1990); Lowe v. Commack Union
Free Sch. Dist., 886 F.2d 1364 (2d Cir. 1989).
21. See Karlo, 849 F.3d at 71-73.
22. See id. at 76-78.
23. See id. at 69; see also Griggs, 401 U.S. at 441; Filing a Charge of
Discrimination, EEOC, https://www.eeoc.gov/employees/charge.cfm (last visited Dec.
20, 2017) (outlining procedural grounds for discrimination claims pursuant to federal
law).
24. See Karlo, 849 F.3d at 71; see also Consol. Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. at
312 (applying the prima facie case in McDonnell Douglas Corp. to ADEA disparate-
treatment claims); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973)
(establishing the prima facie case for discrimination under Title VII).
25. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 429-30; see also Karlo, 849 F.3d at 69.
26. 401 U.S. at 424.
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religion, sex, or national origin. 27
The Court used this case to establish the disparate-impact theory for claims
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. 28 Notably, the Court stated that
"[u]nder the Act, practices, procedures, or tests neutral on their face, and
even neutral in terms of intent, cannot be maintained if they operate to
'freeze' the status quo of prior discriminatory employment practices. "29 The
Court further explained that Title VII does not require employers to hire
individuals because they may fall under a protected class, but rather, that
employers refrain from engaging in discriminatory policies that favor a
particular group.30  Thereafter, the disparate-impact analysis has
encompassed challenges to "practices that are fair in form, but
discriminatory in operation." 3 ' However, whether the employer intended for
the policy to be discriminatory is irrelevant.3 2
Following its decision in Griggs, the Court applied a similar reasoning in
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.33 In this case, the McDonnell Douglass
Corporation terminated an employee as part of a reduction-in-force.3 4 The
Court reaffirmed the notion that under Title VII, employers cannot engage
in discriminatory practices.35 As such, if a plaintiff wishes to challenge an
employer's policy under Title VII disparate-treatment grounds, the plaintiff
must meet the prima facie elements from McDonnell.3 6 The Court declared:
This may be done by showing (i) that he belongs to a racial minority;
(ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer was
seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected;
and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained open and the
employer continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant's
qualifications."
27. 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a) (2012).
28. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 430-31; Karlo, 849 F.2d at 69.
29. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 430.
30. Id. at 430-31.
31. Id. at 431.
32. See id. at 430-32 ("[G]ood intent or absence of discriminatory intent does not
redeem employment procedures or testing mechanisms that operate as 'built-in
headwinds' for minority groups and are unrelated to measuring job capability."); see also
Watson v. Fort Worth Bank and Tr., 487 U.S. 977, 987 (1988) (justifying the disparate-
impact theory on grounds that an employer may discriminate against an employee even
where the employer did not intend to do so).
33. 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973).
34. Id. at 794.
35. See id. at 802.
36. See id.
37. Id. at 802.
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Once the plaintiff demonstrates a prima facie case for discrimination, the
employer will only prevail if the policy was based on a "legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason."38 In contrast, a prima facie case for disparate-
impact claims require "isolating and identifying the specific employment
practices that are allegedly responsible for any observed statistical
disparities."39 The distinctions indicated above reveal that lacking intent
does not negate a finding of discrimination.4 0
In Connecticut v. Teal,4 1 the Court assessed an employer's "bottom-line"
defense to a Title VII disparate-impact claim. 42 The State of Connecticut
carried out a hiring process among employees seeking positions as
permanent supervisors, and as such, the State required said employees to take
a written exam.43  The process disparately impacted four employees;
however, a year after the examination, petitioners promoted over twenty
percent of the African American candidates and more than thirteen percent
of its white candidates.44 In highlighting the supposed balance, Connecticut
attempted to justify a policy that disparately impacted certain employees,
because "the 'bottom-line' result of the promotional process [achieved] an
appropriate racial balance." 45 The Court rejected Connecticut's justification,
noting that the disparate-impact analysis prohibits practices that affect an
individual's employment regardless of potential positive results or outcomes
of specific employment practices.4 6
Then in Watson v. Fort Worth Bank and Trust, 47 the Court noted that a
prima facie case for disparate-impact requires that the plaintiff show
"causation" with respect to the new employment practice.48 In doing so, the
Court acknowledged that a plaintiff meets this requirement if he or she can
38. See id.; see also Karlo v. Pittsburgh Glass Works, LLC, 849 F.3d 61, 69-70 (3d
Cir. 2017) (distinguishing the "business necessity" defense for Title VII claims from the
"reasonable factor other than age" defense for ADEA claims).
39. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank and Tr., 487 U.S. 977, 994 (1988); see also Smith v.
City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 241 (2005) (applying the aforementioned prima facie
standard for ADEA disparate-impact claims).
40. See Watson, 487 U.S. at 987 (rejecting that disparate-treatment and disparate-
impact involve different "legal issues").
41. 457 U.S. 440, 442 (1982).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 442-43.
44. See id at 443-44 (noting that more white candidates passed the written exam
compared to African American candidates).
45. See id. at 442-44 (highlighting Connecticut's defense that they ultimately hired
more African American candidates).
46. See id at 450.
47. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank and Tr., 487 U.S. 977, 994 (1988).
48. Id.
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show that the employment practice disparately impacted him or her because
the person falls under the protected class. 49
B. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967
As stated above, the ADEA precludes employers from engaging in
discriminatory measures against employees forty years old or older.50
Specifically, the Act provides that:
It shall be unlawful for an employer--
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's age;
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which
would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee,
because of such individual's age.5 '
Disparate-impact claims fall under section 623(a)(2) of the ADEA. 52 For
a plaintiff to succeed under section 623(a)(2), the plaintiff must meet the
Court's causation standard established in Watson.53 To do so, "the plaintiff
must offer statistical evidence of a kind and degree sufficient to show that
the practice in question has caused the exclusion of applicants for jobs or
promotions because of their membership in a protected group."54
Nonetheless, pursuant to the ADEA, an employer may ultimately prevail if
an employer can successfully show that its determination involved a
"reasonable factor other than age."5 5 For instance, in Smith v. City of
Jackson,5 6 the Court evaluated whether a group of ADEA-covered
employees could bring a disparate-impact claim pursuant to the ADEA to
49. See id. ("[T]he plaintiff must offer statistical evidence of a kind and degree
sufficient to show that the practice in question has caused the exclusion of applicants for
jobs or promotions because of their membership of a protected class.").
50. 29 U.S.C. § 621 (2012).
51. Id. § 623(a)(1)-(2). See generally Zombro v. Balt. City Police Dep't, 868 F.2d
1364, 1369 (4th Cir. 1989) (citing Platt v. Burroughs Corp., 424 F. Supp. 1329, 1340
(E.D. Pa. 1976)) (finding that age discrimination claims are only permissible under
ADEA).
52. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(2); see also Karlo v. Pittsburgh Glass Works, LLC, 849
F.3d 61, 69 (3d Cir. 2017) (citing Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 235 (2005)).
53. See Smith, 544 U.S. at 241 (quoting Watson, 487 U.S. at 994).
54. Watson, 487 U.S. at 994.
55. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (noting that considering "reasonable factors other than
age" would justify practices that would be "otherwise prohibited"); see also Karlo, 849
F.3d at 80 (describing this requirement as a "light burden").
56. 544 U.S. at 228.
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challenge the city's pay raise plan.17 Specifically, the Court found that the
city could lawfully give its police officers a higher raise." In recognizing
disparate-impact claims under the ADEA, Smith extended the concept of the
disparate-impact prima facie case, as described in Watson, to ADEA
claims.59
Furthermore, in Smith, the Court said that "when Congress uses the same
language in two statutes having similar purposes . . . it is appropriate to
presume that Congress intended that text to have the same meaning in both
statutes." 60 Consequently, the Court found that both the ADEA and Title VII
provide for disparate-impact claims because (1) the language in the statutes
only differs in its protected classes, and (2) they both proscribe
discrimination in the workforce.6 ' Moreover, the Court compared the
ADEA's applicability in disparate-treatment and disparate-impact,
specifically finding that the discriminatory policies trigger the ADEA. 62
Where the employer's policy is not related to the employee's age, the
employer is not liable for disparate-treatment.63
However, in Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory,64 the Court
clarified that if an employer invokes section 623(f)(1) of the ADEA as an
affirmative defense to an ADEA disparate-impact claim, the employer "must
not only produce evidence raising the defense, but also persuade the
factfinder of its merit. "65 The Court noted that section 623(f)(1) serves as a
defense to disparate-impact claims because but for the fact that an employer
may prove the policy was based on a "reasonable factor other than age," the
employer would be liable for discriminating against ADEA-covered
employees.66
Finally, disparate-treatment claims fall under section 623(a)(1). 6 7 The
57. Id. at 230-31.
58. See id. at 242 ("Reliance on seniority and rank is unquestionably reasonable
given the City's goal of raising employees' salaries to match those in surrounding
communities."); see also 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2)(A) (allowing employers to implement
"seniority systems").
59. See Smith, 544 U.S. at 241 (noting that merely challenging the city's plan did not
suffice to allege disparate-impact); see also Watson, 487 U.S. at 994.
60. See Smith, 544 U.S. at 233 (citation omitted).
61. See id at 232-34. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012), with 29 U.S.C. §
623(a)(1).
62. Smith, 544 U.S. at 238-39.
63. Id. at 238.
64. 554 U.S. 84 (2008).
65. Id. at 87, 96.
66. See id. at 94-95 (explaining that ADEA "refers to an excuse or justification for
behavior that, standing alone, violates the statute's prohibition").
67. See O'Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 310-12 (1996)
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Court examined a prima facie case for ADEA disparate-treatment claims in
O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp. 68 Specifically, O'Connor
sued his former employer after the employer terminated him when he was
fifty-six years old and replaced him with a forty-year-old.6 9 The Court held
that whether the plaintiff was replaced by an employee not covered by the
ADEA is "utterly irrelevant"70 to a prima facie case of discrimination under
the ADEA.' Consequently, the Court recognized that "the fact that one
person in the protected class has lost out to another person in the protected
class is thus irrelevant, so long as he has lost because of his age. "72 Rather
than focusing on whether the newly hired employee is also covered by the
ADEA, the Court said an assessment of age discrimination claims must
instead consider the age gap between the plaintiff discriminated against and
the newly hired employee.73
C. The Karlo Decision
The Third Circuit's recent holding in Karlo, namely that employees may
bring subgroup disparate-impact claims, stands in stark contrast to that of its
sister courts. 74  The 2008 automobile industry crisis affected PGW, a
Pennsylvania-based automotive glass manufacturing company, especially
with sales.75 PGW ultimately implemented reductions-in-force, and in the
process, gave its directors permission to fire employees in their respective
divisions.76 PGW eventually fired about 100 employees. Seven of the
terminated employees, all fifty years old or older, filed charges against PGW
before the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), but their
attempt to challenge PGW's reductions-in-force failed.7 ' The group also
filed a class action in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of
Pennsylvania, alleging age discrimination on disparate-impact and disparate-
(extending the prima facie case to ADEA disparate-treatment claims).
68. Id. at 312.
69. Id. at 309-10.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 311-12.
72. Id.
73. See id. at 313 (recognizing the probative value of a plaintiff showing that the
newly hired employee is "substantially younger" as opposed to showing that the ADEA
does not extend to the newly hired employee).
74. Karlo v. Pittsburgh Glass Works, LLC, 849 F.3d 61, 68-69 (3d Cir. 2017).
75. Id. at 66.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. See id.
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treatment grounds. 79 The Third Circuit found ADEA subgroup disparate-
impact evidence permissible, "so long as that evidence meets the usual
standards for admissibility."so According to the Third Circuit, holding
otherwise would prevent challenges to policies contemplated by the
ADEA.'
i. Circuit Split Jurisprudential History
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit addressed subgroup
claims in Lowe v. Commack Union Free School District.82 In Lowe, most of
appellee's newly hired employees were over forty years old even though
most of the applicant pool was comprised of candidates under forty years
old.83 The court determined that if a policy resulted in more employees being
covered by the ADEA, getting hired could not be considered a claim of
disparate-impact.8 4 Thus, the court found that the Commack Union Free
School District failed to establish a prima facie case for disparate-impact
because their statistical evidence did not show that their employer's actions
benefitted employees under forty years old." In other words, in the Second
Circuit, a plaintiff alleging disparate-impact must show that the employer's
policy disparately impacted the plaintiff because the plaintiff is a member of
the ADEA's class of employees ages forty-and-over.86
The Second Circuit recognized that employees may bring disparate-
treatment and/or disparate-impact claims pursuant to the ADEA precisely
because of the similarities in the texts of Title VII and the ADEA.17
However, the court relied on Watson to explain that the Supreme Court
assessed disparate-impact discrimination claims on the extent to which
employer's policy affected the employee's protected class." In doing so, the
79. Id. at 66-67.
80. Id. at 68-69.
81. See id. at 69 ("A contrary rule would ignore significant age-based disparities.
Where such disparities exist, they must be justified pursuant to the ADEA's relatively
broad defenses.").
82. 886 F.2d 1364, 1370-71 (2d Cir. 1989).
83. See id. at 1371 (finding that this policy gave preference for ADEA covered
employees).
84. See id (noting that two-thirds of the candidates that the appellee hired were
covered by the ADEA).
85. Id.
86. See id. at 1370-71 (quoting Watson v. Fort Worth Bank and Tr., 487 U.S. 977,
994 (1988)) ("Lowe and Delisi failed to demonstrate that any of defendants' hiring
practices 'caused the exclusion of applicants for jobs . . . because of their membership in
a protected group."').
87. See id. at 1369 (citation omitted).
88. See id. at 1371, 1373 (citing Watson, 487 U.S. at 997).
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Second Circuit views Watson to say that plaintiffs can only recover under
the ADEA where the evidence shows that the employer discriminated against
them for being a part of the ADEA's class.8 9
Further, the Second Circuit reasoned that because the ADEA considers
employees forty-and-over a protected group, for plaintiffs to meet the
disparate-impact prima facie standard, plaintiffs have to show statistics that
the policy favored employees not protected by the ADEA. 90 Consequently,
the Second Circuit rejects disparate-impact where employers ultimately hire
more forty-and-older employees. 9' Notably, the Second Circuit
distinguished the plaintiff s age discrimination claim from Teal, even though
Teal explicitly rejected the "bottom-line" defense. 92 Thus, in rejecting
subgroup disparate-impact claims, the court noted that holding otherwise
would mean that "any plaintiff can take his or her own age as the lower end
of a 'sub-protected group' and argue that said 'sub-group' is disparately
impacted." 93  However, the court upheld disparate-treatment subgroup
claims.94
Comparatively, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has
addressed disparate-impact subgroup claims twice. First, in Barnes v.
GenCorp, the court recognized that "an employer violates [the] ADEA when
preference is given to a younger employee even if the younger employee is
within the protected class of persons age forty-and-over."9 5 However, the
court further found that such reasoning simply does not extend to disparate-
impact claims. 96 Additionally, the court held that subgroup comparators
enable courts to presume that discrimination occurred. 97 To this end, the
Sixth Circuit noted that policies benefiting younger employees covered by
the ADEA can trigger ADEA liability.9 8 The court's reasoning focused on
the probative value of statistical evidence, and as such, the court explained
that where the evidence shows a tendency to terminate older individuals,
89. See id. at 1370-71 (ruling against the plaintiffs because they failed to meet the
Watson standard).
90. See id. at 1371.
91. Id.
92. See id. at 1371; see also Karlo v. Pittsburgh Glass Works, LLC, 849 F.3d 61, 76
(3d Cir. 2017) (applying the Teal standard in the ADEA subgroup context).
93. Lowe, 886 F.2d at 1373.
94. See id. at 1374.
95. 896 F.2d 1457, 1466 (6th Cir. 1990) (quoting McCorstin v. U.S. Steel Corp., 621
F.2d 749, 754 (5th Cir. 1980)).
96. Id. at 1467 n.12.
97. See id. at 1466 (rejecting "that the only valid statistics would necessarily divide
the employees into groups age 40-and-over and those under 40").
98. Id.
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such evidence would demonstrate disparate-treatment. 99
The Sixth Circuit revisited subgroup disparate-impact claims in Smith v.
Tennessee Valley Authority.'00 In this case, the court held that a plaintiff
meets the prima facie case on a disparate-impact claim where the employer's
actions allow the employer to hire more employees thirty-nine-and-under.' 0 '
The court aligned with the employer,' 02 finding no applicable disparate-
impact because the defendant had retained employees aged forty-and-
over.1 0 3 In Smith, the Sixth Circuit relied on the Second Circuit's reasoning
in Lowe,104 noting that the plaintiff failed to show a prima facie disparate-
impact case because "the fact that all six terminated employees were within
the protected range does not support a finding of disparate impact when four
of the six retained employees as ACSs were also within the protected age
group."0 5 Consequently, the Sixth Circuit reasoned that where the evidence
shows that other ADEA covered employees benefitted from the employer's
policy, the plaintiff cannot meet the prima facie case for disparate-impact.1 0 6
Like the Second Circuit, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
requires plaintiffs to be discriminated against "because of their membership
in a protected group" to demonstrate disparate-impact. 0 7  In EEOC v.
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 's the court precluded disparate-impact subgroup
claims and opined that because the O'Connor Court addressed the prima
facie case for disparate-treatment claims, the Court's rationale did not extend
to disparate-impact claims. The Eighth Circuit relies on Watson in similar
cases, noting that plaintiffs can only show disparate-impact where the
evidence reveals that they were discriminated against as protected employees
99. See id. at 1467.
100. See generally No. 90-5396, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 1754 (6th Cir. Feb. 4, 1991).
101. See id at *11 (citing Lowe v. Commack Union Free Sch. Dist., 886 F.2d 1364,
1371 (2d Cir. 1989)).
102. Id. at *11-12.
103. See id. at *12 ("A plaintiff cannot succeed under a disparate impact theory by
showing that younger members of the protected class were preferred over older members
of the protected class.").
104. Id. at *1I1- 12.
105. See id But see Karlo v. Pittsburgh Glass Works, LLC, 849 F.3d 61, 78 (3d Cir.
2017) ("Teal held that a plaintiff can succeed under a disparate-impact theory if other
members of the protected class were preferred .... ).
106. TVA, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 1754, at *11-12.
107. See EEOC v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 191 F.3d 948, 950 (8th Cir. 1999)
(quoting Watson v. Fort Worth Bank and Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 994 (1988)).
108. See id. at 950-51 ("The Court in O'Connor did not address disparate-impact
claims under the ADEA, and thus we do not think that O'Connor has any relevance to
our analysis here.").
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under the ADEA.' 09 Although the Eighth Circuit rejected subgroup claims,
the court recognized that allowing subgroup claims would not ordinarily
mean that all plaintiffs would be able to show that the employers' policy
disparately impacted them."o Rather, the Eighth Circuit noted that
disparate-impact subgroup claims are impermissible because (1) employers
would be liable for reductions-in-force disparately impacting its employees
even when they benefit other employees covered by the ADEA, and (2)
recognizing subgroup evidence means that age would become a factor in
deciding whether to terminate an employee."'
III. WHY KARLO HAS PAVED THE WAY FOR ADEA SUBGROUP DISPARATE-
IMPACT CLAIMS
The Third Circuit's decision in Karlo created a circuit split with respect to
subgroup disparate-impact claims." 2 The court specifically found that
subgroup claims constituted a "compelling basis" to create a circuit split." 3
The court acknowledged that while the employees indeed showed disparate-
impact, requiring them to compare effects of PGW's firing policies on the
employees with its effects on employees forty-and-over would disregard the
disparate impact suffered by the plaintiffs."14
A. The Third Circuit's Reading of Section 623 of the ADEA
The Third Circuit's interpretation of sections 623(a)(1) and 623(a)(2) of
the ADEA is the most important factor in considering subgroup claims under
section 623(a)(2)."5  Karlo recognizes that these subsections refer to
different theories of discrimination.1 6 Despite their differences, the court
109. See id at 950 (precluding ADEA disparate-impact subgroup evidence).
110. See id. (rejecting the lower court's finding that plaintiffs would always succeed
in ADEA subgroup disparate-impact claims).
111. Id. at 951.
112. See Karlo v. Pittsburgh Glass Works, LLC, 849 F.3d 61, 75 (3d Cir. 2017)
(rejecting the other circuit court decisions because "they are contradicted by O'Connor
and Teal, confuse evidentiary concerns with statutory interpretation, and incorrectly
assume that recognizing subgroups will proliferate liability for reasonable employment
practices").
113. See id. at 75 n.7 (citing Wagner v. PennWest Farm Credit, ACA, 109 F.3d 909,
912 (3d Cir. 1997)) (noting the court's reluctance to create circuit splits absent a
compelling basis' to do so).
114. See id. at 68, 72 (identifying this as the result of the policy prioritizing ADEA
covered employees under fifty years of age).
115. See id. at 69 ("Disparate treatment is governed by § 623(a)(1); disparate impact
is governed by § 623(a)(2).").
116. Id. at 71. (explaining that the similarities between each subsection mandated that
the "interpretation of [the disparate-impact subsection] . . . be consistent with our
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reasoned that the subsections were analogous because they prohibit
discrimination "because of [an] individual's age.""'7 The court noted that
the language in these subsections shows that the challenger's age, rather than
the ADEA's protected class, is indicative of disparate impact." 8
The Third Circuit's explanation of the ADEA should bewilder no one
considering the Court's understanding of Title VII and the ADEA in both
O'Connor and Smith.119 In O'Connor, the Court first had to determine
whether the prima facie case in McDonnell, a Title VII case, also applied to
ADEA discrimination claims-the Court answered affirmatively.1 20 While
the Third Circuit merely cited Smith to compare the language in Title VII,
the ADEA, and to explain the employer's burden under section 631(a), the
Court's interpretation of the ADEA and Title VII in that case confirmed that
Title VII principles indeed apply to the ADEA.121
The Third Circuit's interpretation of sections 623(a)(1) and 623(a)(2) of
the ADEA further demonstrates that the court correctly applied O'Connor in
deciding for Karlo.1 22 In O'Connor, the Court explained that a primafacie
case permits courts to assume that employers discriminated against
employees.1 23 However, the Court also held that requiring employees to
prove that they were replaced with someone not covered by the ADEA would
not necessarily prove discrimination.1 2 4
The Third Circuit specifically relied on Watson to justify O'Connor's
scope in disparate-impact subgroup claims.1 25 Recall that in Watson, the
Court reasoned that although disparate-impact and disparate-treatment have
interpretation of the disparate-treatment provision").
117. Id.
118. See id. ("Thus, 'adversely affect ... because of such individual's age' must mean
adversely affect based on age, not adversely affect based on forty-and-older status.").
119. See generally Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228-41 (2005) (confirming that
Title VII principles sometimes apply in the ADEA context); O'Connor v. Consol. Coin
Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308-11 (1996) (assuming that Title VII principles apply in the
ADEA context).
120. See O'Connor, 517 U.S. at 311 ("We have never had the occasion to decide
whether that application of the Title VII rule to the ADEA context is correct, but since
the parties do not contest that point, we shall assume it.").
121. See Smith, 544 U.S. at 240 (explaining that disparate-impact theory, under Title
VII, is not "categorically unavailable under the ADEA").
122. See Karlo, 849 F.3d at 71.
123. See O'Connor, 517 U.S. at 311-12 (assuming that Title VII principles apply in
the ADEA context).
124. See id. at 312 ("[T]here can be no greater inference of age discrimination (as
opposed to '40 and over' discrimination) when a 40-year-old is replaced by a 39-year-
old than when a 56-year-old is replaced by a 40-year-old.").
125. See Karlo, 849 F.3d at 69.
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two different prima facie requirements, the "ultimate legal issue" remains
the same 26 and that the disparate-impact theory recognizes that employment
practices can be discriminatory even where they lack intent.'2 7 Accordingly,
the fact that O'Connor focuses on disparate-treatment, as acknowledged by
the Third Circuit, does not matter as section 623(a)(1) and section 623(a)(2)
of the ADEA require courts to determine whether an employer is liable for
age discrimination.' 2 8 The Third Circuit's interpretation of the ADEA is thus
consistent with Watson's reasoning of the disparate-impact theory.1 2 9
Finally, the underlying reasoning behind the disparate-impact theory also
applies to the Third Circuit's reasoning. 3 0 In Griggs, the Court recognized
the disparate-impact theory because the Court found that Congress wanted
employers to refrain from practices that would otherwise allow them to
discriminate against their employees.' 3 ' The Court also vehemently noted
that Title VII is a safeguard against policies that favor a particular group.13 2
Furthermore, the Court noted that Title VII required employers to show that
their practices are indeed employment related.1 3 3 But most importantly, the
Court said that "Congress directed the thrust of the Act to the consequences
of employment practices, not simply the motivation."1 3 4 Therefore, as the
Third Circuit found, subgroup evidence can still show disparate-impact.1 35
B. ADEA: Protected Class or the Challenger?
While anyone falling under any of Title VII's protected classes can allege
disparate-impact or disparate-treatment, the ADEA only protects those who
are forty years old or older.1 36 In Watson, the Court acknowledged that
126. See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank and Tr., 487 U.S. 977, 987 (1988) (noting that
"distinguishing features of factual issues that typically dominate in disparate impact
cases do not imply that the ultimate legal issue is different than in cases where disparate
treatment analysis is used").
127. See id
128. See Karlo, 849 F.3d at 69-70.
129. See id. at 71-72 (quoting Watson, 487 U.S. at 987) (noting that "a disparate
impact 'may in operation be functionally equivalent to intentional discrimination"').
130. See generally Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424-30 (1971).
131. See id. at 429-30. (explaining that Title VII requires employers to not engage in
discriminatory practices).
132. See id. (noting that in enacting Title VII, Congress intended "to achieve equality
of employment opportunities and remove barriers that have operated in the past to favor
an identifiable group of white employees over other employees").
133. See id. at 429-31 (requiring the employer to demonstrate a nexus between its
practice and job performance, i.e., job-relatedness).
134. Id. at 432 (emphasis added).
135. See Karlo v. Pittsburgh Glass Works, LLC, 849 F.3d 61, 72 (3d Cir. 2017).
136. See id at 71 ("[T]he ADEA protects a class of individuals at least forty years old
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disparate-impact recovery also depended on the extent to which the alleged
disparate-impact itself relates to the fact that the employee is entitled to Title
VII protection. 137 The Third Circuit, however, found that the ADEA, rather
than protecting a particular class, protects the individuals in the forty-and-
over class contemplated by the ADEA.138
The Third Circuit's reasoning follows from the Court's decision in
O'Connor.39 In O'Connor, the Court said that the ADEA contemplates a
forty-plus class because discrimination under the ADEA is related to the
employer's age requirements, not the fact that the employee falls under the
ADEA.1 4 0 That the ADEA happens to embrace an age requirement merely
limits whom is entitled to ADEA protection.141
The Third Circuit also relied on Teal to find that section 623(a)(2) refers
to the employee's rights.1 42 Moreover, the Third Circuit's opinion also
proscribed a "bottom-line defense" to disparate-impact claims in the ADEA
context.1 43 In Teal, the Court interpreted section 703(a)(2) to relate to the
effects of the employment practice at issue on the individual.1 44 This analysis
ultimately led the Court to reject the "bottom-line defense."1 45 Specifically,
the Court found that in enacting Title VII, Congress certainly did not want
employers to be able to justify discriminating against their employees by
showing that their policies benefitted the employee's protected trait.1 4 6 The
. . . ."). Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)-(2) (2012) (prohibiting discrimination
"because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin"), with 29
U.S.C. § 631(a) (2012) ("The prohibitions in this chapter shall be limited to individuals
who are at least 40 years of age.").
137. See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank and Tr., 487 U.S. 977, 994 (1988) (explaining
that upon establishing a discriminatory practice, the plaintiff must further demonstrate
that the practice "has caused the exclusion of applicants for jobs or promotions because
of their membership in a protected group").
138. Karlo, 849 F.3d at 71 (noting that the ADEA contemplates age, not a distinct
protected class).
139. See id. (deriving a "key insight" from O'Connor).
140. See O'Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 312 (1996).
141. See Karlo, 849 F.3d at 74.
142. See id. at 71 ("The key insight from O'Connor is that the forty-and-older line
drawn by [section] 631(a) constrains the ADEA's general scope . . . .").
143. See id at 72 (noting that bottom-line statistical arguments cannot overcome
inherently discriminatory practices).
144. See Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 450-51 (1982) (rejecting the "bottom-
line" defense by finding that employees must be able to "compete equally" under Title
VII).
145. See id. at 451 (explaining that Title VII precludes policies that discriminate
against individuals).
146. See id. at 455 ("It is clear that Congress never intended to give an employer
license to discriminate against some employees on the basis of race or sex merely because
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Third Circuit applied the facts in Teal to Karlo to find for the plaintiffs.1 4 7
Specifically, the court said that like the "bottom-line defense," which allows
plaintiffs to recover for disparate-impact, subgroup evidence also serves this
purpose.1 48  Therefore, whether other employees covered by the ADEA
benefited from this employer's policy should not be dispositive of subgroup
claims. 149
C. PGW's Probable Appeal
Much speculation revolves around the nature of the Third Circuit's
decision in Karlo, namely whether PGW will take this issue to the Court.15 0
As such, if PGW does appeal, presumably highlighting the aforementioned
circuit split, the Court will likely affirm the Third Circuit's decision in
Karlo. '5' Specifically, the Court should interpret section 623(a)(2) as
analogous to section 623(a)(1).1 52  Indeed, as the Court previously
recognized, age discrimination will always involve employers terminating
employees because of the notion that an employee's age will affect
performance. 15' Thus, the ADEA is, and should continue to be a safeguard
for the specific employee challenging the employer's putative discriminatory
policy. 154 The Court noted in Smith that the correlation between age and
productivity could be used to explain why Congress limited the ADEA's
scope to individuals forty and older. 5 5 Therefore, the Court might also take
into account the underlying notion that the ADEA protects those employees
he favorably treats other members of the employees' group.").
147. See Karlo, 849 F.3d at 72 (explaining that an employer's policy might favor
younger members of the ADEA-protected group is irrelevant in determining whether the
employer's oldest employees were disparately affected due to their age).
148. See id.
149. See id. at 73.
150. See Dorrian, supra note 14.
151. See generally Karlo, 849 F.3d at 68-86 (ruling in favor of ADEA subgroup
disparate-impact claims).
152. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1)-(2) (2012); see also Karlo, 849 F.3d at 71 (comparing
the language in both § 623(a)(1) and § 623(a)(2) in determining that 'adversely affect
. . . because of such individual's age' must mean adversely affected based on age, not
adversely affect based on forty-and-older status").
153. See Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggings, 507 U.S. 604, 610 (1993) ("It is the very
essence of age discrimination for an older employee to be fired because the employer
believes that productivity and competence decline with old age."); see also Smith v. City
of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 240 (2005).
154. See Karlo, 849 F.3d at 72-73 (concluding that courts can allow subgroup
evidence and still find disparate-impact).
155. See Smith, 544 U.S. at 240 (noting that "Congress' decision to limit the coverage
of the ADEA . . . is consistent with the fact that age . . . not uncommonly has relevance
to an individual's capacity to engage in certain types of employment").
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whom, at some point in their careers, were in a better position because of
their experience.15 6
Nonetheless, the Third Circuit's decision also shows that even if this
circuit split is resolved by allowing subgroup claims, the ADEA will
continue to side with businesses that indeed identify a reasonable
justification for terminating employees. '7 Therefore, permitting subgroup
claims does not affect the employer's burden of proof under section
623(f)(1 ).15
IV. ADEA DISPARATE-IMPACT CLAIMS IN THE MIDST OF A CIRCUIT SPLIT
The Supreme Court gave the lower courts "the proper solution" to assess
ADEA claims and the probative value of the challenger's evidence.1 5 9
O'Connor explains that to determine whether the employer discriminated
against the employee, courts should compare the age difference between the
former employee and the newly hired employee, rather than the extent to
which the newly hired employee falls under the ADEA's protected class.1 6 0
Therefore, the Court should uphold the Third Circuit's position.161
A. What Businesses Should Consider Before Laying off Employees
With more businesses undergoing reductions, it is imperative that the
business community becomes more aware of the ADEA's requirements.1 6 2
The reality is that businesses have, and will continue, to undergo
156. See GEORGE RUTHERGLEN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW: VISIONS OF
EQUALITY IN THEORY AND DOCTRINE 208 (3d ed. 2010); see also Karlo, 849 F.3d at 74
(illustrating how precluding subgroup claims would limit the older workers' chances of
bringing disparate-impact claims compared to younger individuals).
157. See Karlo, 849 F.3d at 80.
158. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (2012); see also Karlo, 849 F.3d at 69 (explaining that
employers can rebut a prima facie case by "arguing that the challenged practice was
based on 'reasonable factors other than age"'). But see Dorrian, supra note 14 (noting a
concern that allowing subgroup claims will result in "statistical manipulation").
159. O'Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 312 (1996) (quoting
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 358 (1977)) (recognizing that a primafacie
case "requires 'evidence adequate to create an inference that an employment decision
was based on a[n] [illegal] discriminatory criterion').
160. See O'Connor, 517 U.S. at 312-13 (noting that courts use different approaches
in assessing statistical evidence, but finding that "the fact that a replacement is
substantially younger than the plaintiff is a far more reliable indicator of age
discrimination than is the fact that the plaintiff was replaced by someone outside the
protected class").
161. See also Karlo, 849 F.3d at 68 (holding that subgroup disparate-impact claims
are "cognizable under the ADEA").
162. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34; see also Eisenberg, supra note 5 (noting that more
businesses could undergo voluntary terminations).
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employment reductions to compensate for issues such as financial crises
and/or operational costs.' 63 Typically, businesses terminate employees to
lower the costs of their employees' salaries and benefits. 6 4 Once businesses
undergo employment reductions, they can simply eliminate those positions
occupied by their former employees. 6 5 Most importantly, at least in the
ADEA context, older employees generally garner higher wages than younger
employees.' 66 While employers should disregard any plan to terminate older
employees simply because hiring younger employees would cut down costs,
the Third Circuit's opinion certainly recognizes that employment practices
may always impact certain employees disparately.16 7
V. CONCLUSION
Although PGW has yet to appeal its case, the company will likely do so
given the current circuit split. The Second, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits all
precluded ADEA subgroup disparate-impact claims; nonetheless, the Third
Circuit's thorough overview of the ADEA and Title VII makes Karlo the
most persuasive decision among the circuit courts. The Third Circuit's
decision in Karlo is indeed the most consistent with the Court's
interpretation of the ADEA. As the Third Circuit noted, the jurisprudence
should not focus on whether subgroup claims may lead to more litigation.
Rather, disparate-impact jurisprudence must recognize that precluding
subgroup claims would limit a plaintiffs ability to challenge discriminatory
policies pursuant to ADEA. Thus, if PGW appeals to the Court, the Court
should uphold the Third Circuit's decision in Karlo and rule in favor of
subgroup claims.
163. See generally Eisenberg, supra note 5.
164. Michael L. Rosen, Tips for Planning Reductions in Force, FOLEY HOAG LLP 2
(2009), http://www.foleyhoag.com/-/media/files/foley%/`20hoag/publications/ebooks%/`2
Oand%20whitepapers/2013/rosen tips for planning reductions in force.ashx?la=en
("The typical objective in a layoff is to reduce expenses through the paring down of
payroll and benefits-related costs.").
165. See Barnes v. GenCorp, 896 F.2d 1457, 1465 (6th Cir. 1990) ("A work force
reduction situation occurs when business considerations cause an employer to eliminate
one or more positions within the company.").
166. RUTHERGLEN, supra note 156, at 214.
167. See Karlo v. Pittsburgh Glass Works, LLC, 849 F.3d 61, 79 (3d Cir. 2017); see
also RUTHERGLEN, supra note 156, at 214 ("Instead of allowing age-based discharges
because of the higher pay generally received by older workers, the ADEA allow
employers to take account of the declining productivity of such workers through an
exception for voluntary retirement plans.").
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Benjamin Leff, B.A., Oberlin College; M.A., University of Chicago Divinity School; J.D., Yale University. Professor of
Law
Amanda Cohen Leiter, B.S., M.S., Stanford University; M.S., University of Washington; J.D., Harvard University.
Professor ofLaw
James P. May, B.A., Carleton College; J.D., Harvard University. Professor ofLaw
Binny Miller, B.A., Carleton College; J.D., University of Chicago. Professor ofLaw and Director ofthe Criminal
Justice Clinic
Elliott S. Milstein, B.A., University of Hartford; J.D., University of Connecticut; LL.M., Yale University. Professor of
Law
Camille A. Nelson, B.A., University of Toronto, Canada; LL.B. University of Ottawa, Canada, LL.M., Columbia
University. Dean
Femanda Nicola, B.A., Law Degree, University of Turin; Ph.D., Trento University, Italy; LL.M., S.J.D., Harvard
University. Professor ofLaw
Mark Niles, B.A., Wesleyan University; J.D., Stanford University. Professor ofLaw
Diane F. Orentlicher, B.A., Yale University; J.D., Columbia University. Professor ofLaw
Teresa Godwin Phelps, B.A., M.A., Ph.D., University ofNotre Dame; M.S.L., Yale University. Director ofthe Legal
Rhetoric and Writing Program and Professor ofLaw
*Andrew D. Pike, B.A., Swarthmore College; J.D., University ofPennsylvania. Professor ofLaw
Nancy D. Polikoff, B.A., University of Pennsylvania; M.A., The George Washington University; J.D., Georgetown
University. Professor ofLaw
Andrew F. Popper, B.A., Baldwin-Wallace College; J.D., DePaul University; LL.M., The George Washington
University. Professor ofLaw and Director ofthe Integrated Curriculum Program
Jamin B. Raskin, B.A., J.D., Harvard University. Director ofthe LL.M Program in Law and Government and Professor
ofLaw
Jayesh Rathod, A.B., Harvard University; J.D., Columbia University. Professor ofLaw and Director ofthe Immigrant
Justice Clinic
Ira P. Robbins, A.B., University ofPennsylvania; J.D., Harvard University. Professor ofLaw and Justice, Director of
the JD./M.S. Dual Degree Program in Law and Justice, and Barnard T Welsh Scholar
Jenny M. Roberts, B.A., Yale University; J.D., New York University. Professor ofLaw
Ezra Rosser, B.A., Yale University; J.D., Harvard Law School; M.Phil., University of Cambridge. Professor ofLaw
Herman Schwartz, A.B., J.D., Harvard University. Professor ofLaw, Co-Director, Center for Human Rights and
Humanitarian Law
Ann Shalleck, A.B., Bryn Mawr College; J.D., Harvard University. Professor ofLaw, Director ofthe Women and the
Law Program, and Carrington Shields Scholar
*Mary Siegel, B.A., Vassar College; J.D., Yale University. Professor ofLaw
Anita Sinha, B.A., Barnard College; J.D., New York University. Practitioner in Residence, Immigrant Justice Clinic
Brenda Smith, B.A., Spelman College; J.D., Georgetown University. Professor ofLaw
*David Snyder, B.A., Yale University; J.D., Tulane Law School. Professor ofLaw and Director, Business Law
Program
Robert Tsai, B.A., University of California at Los Angeles; J.D., Yale University. Professor ofLaw
Anthony E. Varona, A.B., Boston College; J.D., Boston College; LL.M., Georgetown University. Professor ofLaw and
Associate Dean for Faculty and Academic Affairs
Perry Wallace, Jr., B.Engr., Vanderbilt University; J.D., Columbia University. Professor ofLaw and Director ofthe
J.D./MBA Dual Degree Program
Lindsay F. Wiley, A.B., J.D., Harvard University; M.P.H., Johns Hopkins University. Associate Professor ofLaw
Paul R. Williams, A.B., University of Califomia at Davis; J.D., Stanford University; Ph.D., University of Cambridge.
Rebecca I. Grazier, Professor ofLaw and International Relations and Director ofthe J.D./MA. DualDegree Program
Law Library Administration
John Heywood, B.S., Northern Arizona University; J.D., American University Washington College of Law. Associate
Law Librarian
*Billie Jo Kaufman, B.S., M.A., Indiana University; J.D. Nova Southeastern University. Professor ofLaw and
Associate Dean for Library and Information Resources
Sima Mirkin, B.Engr.Econ., Byelorussian Polytechnic Institute; M.L.S., University of Maryland. Associate Law
Librarian
Shannon Roddy, Assistant Law Librarian
William T. Ryan, B.A., Boston University; J.D., American University Washington College of Law; M.L.S., University
of Maryland. Law Librarian
Ripple Weistling, B.A., Brandeis University; M.A., King's College; J.D., Georgetown University; M.S.L.S., Catholic
University of America. Assistant Law Librarian
Linda Wen, B.A., Hunan Normal University; M.S., University of South Carolina, Associate Law Librarian, Head of
Collections and Bibliographic Services
Emeriti
Isaiah Baker, A.B., Yale University; M.A., DePaul University; M.B.A., J.D., Columbia University; LL.M., Harvard
University. Associate Professor ofLaw Emeritus
Daniel Bradlow, B.A., University of Witwatersrand, South Africa; J.D., Northeastern University Law School; LL.M.,
Georgetwon University Law Center; LL.D., University of Pretoria. Professor ofLaw Emeritus
David F. Chavkin, B.S., Michigan State University; J.D., University of Califomia at Berkeley. Professor ofLaw
Emeritus
Egon Guttman, LL.B., LL.M., University ofLondon. Professor ofLaw and Levitt Memorial Trust Scholar Emeritus
Patrick Kehoe, B.C.S., Finance, Seattle University; J.D., M.L.S., University of Washington. Professor ofLaw Emeritus
Nicholas Kittrie, A.B, LL.B., M.A., University of Kansas; LL.M., S.J.D., Georgetown University Law Center.
University Professor Emeritus
Candace S. Kovacic-Fleischer, A.B., Wellesley College; J.D., Northeastern University. Professor ofLaw
Susan Lewis, B.A., University of California Los Angeles; J.D., Southwestern University; M.Libr., University of
Washington Seattle. Law Librarian Emeritus
Robert Lubic, Professor ofLaw Emeritus
Anthony Morella, A.B., Boston University; J.D., American University Washington College of Law. Professor ofLaw
Emeritus
Michael E. Tigar, B.A., J.D., University of California at Berkeley. Professor Emeritus
Robert G. Vaughn, B.A., J.D., University of Oklahoma; LL.M., Harvard University. Professor ofLaw Emeritus and A.
Allen King Scholar
Richard Wilson, B.A., DePauw University; J.D., University of Illinois College of Law. Professor ofLaw Emeritus
Special Faculty Appointments
Nancy S. Abramowitz, B.S., Cornell University; J.D., Georgetown University. Professor ofPractice ofLaw and
Director of the Janet R. Spragens Federal Tax Clinic.
Elizabeth Beske, A.B., Princeton University; J.D., Columbia University. LegalRhetoric Instructor
Elizabeth Boals, B.S., Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University; J.D., George Mason University. Practitioner
in Residence, Associate Director, Trial Practice Program
Hillary Brill, A.B., Harvard University; J.D., Georgetown University. Practitioner in Residence, Glushko-Samuelson
Intellectual Property Law Clinic
Claire Donohue, B.S., Cornell University; J.D., M.S.W., Boston College, LL.M., The George Washington University
Law School. Practitioner in Residence
Paul Figley, B.A., Franklin & Marshall College; J.D., Southern Methodist University. Associate Director ofLegal
Rhetoric and Legal Rhetoric Instructor
Sean Flynn, B.A., Pitzer College (Claremont); J.D., Harvard University. Associate Director, Program on Information
Justice and Intellectual Property and Professorial Lecturer in Residence
Jon Gould, A.B., University of Michigan; M.P.P., J.D., Harvard University; Ph.D., University of Chicago. Affiliate
Professor; Professor, Department of Justice, Law & Society, School of Public Affairs; Director of
Washington Institute for Public and International Affairs Research
Jonathan D. Grossberg, B.A., J.D., Cornell University; LL.M., New York University. Practitioner in Residence, Janet R.
Spragens Federal Tax Clinic
Jean C. Han, A.B., Harvard University; J.D., Yale University; LL.M., Georgetown University. Practitioner in Residence,
Women and the Law Clinic
Elizabeth Keith, B.A., University ofNorth Carolina at Chapel Hill; J.D., George Mason University. Legal Rhetoric
Instructor
Daniela Kraiem, B.A., University of Califomia at Santa Barbara; J.D., University of California at Davis. Associate
Director ofthe Women and the Law Program
Jeffery S. Lubbers, A.B., Cornell University; J.D., University of Chicago. Professor of Practice in Administrative Law
Claudia Martin, Law Degree, Universidad de Buenos Aires; LL.M., American University Washington College of Law.
Professorial Lecturer in Residence
Juan Mendez, Certificate, American University College ofLaw; Law Degree, Stella Maris Catholic University.
Professor ofHuman Rights Law in Residence
Sherizaan Minwalla, B.A., University of Cincinnati; M.A., Loyola University; J.D., Chicago-Kent College of Law.
Practitioner in Residence, International Human Rights Law Clinic
Lauren Onkeles-Klein, B.A., University of Wisconsin Madison; J.D., Georgetown University. Practitioner in Residence,
Disability Rights Law Clinic
Sunita Patel, Practitioner in Residence, Civil Advocacy Clinic
Horacio Grigera Na6n, LL.D., J.D., University of Buenos Aires; L.L.M., S.J.D. Harvard University. Distinguished
Practitioner in Residence and Director ofthe International Arbitration Program
Andrea Parra, Practitioner in Residence, Immigrant Justice Clinic
Victoria Phillips, B.A., Smith College; J.D., American University Washington College ofLaw. Professor ofthe
Practice of Law
Heather Ridenour, B.B.A., Texas Women's University; J.D., Texas Wesleyan. Director ofLegal Analysis Program and
Legal Rhetoric Instructor
Diego Rodriguez-Pinzon, J.D., Universidad de los Andes; LL.M., American University Washington College of Law;
S.J.D., The George Washington University. Professorial Lecturer in Residence and Co-Director, Academy
on Human Rights and Humanitarian Law
Susana SaCouto, B.A., Brown University; M.AL.D, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy; J.D., Northeastern
University. Professorial Lecturer in Residence and Director, War Crimes Research Office
Macarena Saez, J.D., University of Chile School of Law; L.L.M. Yale Law School. Fellow in the InternationalLegal
Studies Program
William J. Snape, ILL, B.A., University of Califomia at Los Angeles; J.D., George Washington University. Director of
Adjunct Development and Fellow in Environmental Law
David Spratt, B.A., The College of William and Mary; J.D., American University Washington College of Law. Legal
Rhetoric Instructor
Richard Ugelow, B.A., Hobart College; J.D., American University Washington College of Law; LL.M., Georgetown
University. Practitioner in Residence
Diane Weinroth, B.A., University of Califomia Berkeley; J.D., Columbia University. Supervising Attorney, Women and
the Law Clinic
Stephen Wermiel, A.B., Tufts University; J.D., American University Washington College ofLaw. Professor ofthe
Practice ofLaw
William Yeomans, B.A., Trinity College; J.D., Boston University Law School; LL.M., Harvard University. Practitioner
in Residence, Director ofLegislative Practicum
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